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Fetal culture
Ultrasound imaging and the formation of 
the human
mahmut mutman and ersan ocak
If the medicalization of pregnancy is a defining aspect 
of modernity, it has reached a new stage with the 
invention of ultrasound imaging of the human fetus in 
the womb. The use of ultrasound imaging has become 
a routine aspect of the experience of pregnancy in 
modern urban settings.1 Viewing the image of the 
fetus and of its organs, its postures and movements 
has now become a family rite governed by the medical 
apparatus and its responsible agent, the doctor or other 
medical practitioner. Alongside the rapid development 
of this technological and institutional practice in the 
hospital cubicle, there is a proliferation of fetal images 
in the public sphere. As Barbara Duden puts it, ‘we 
are overwhelmed with fetuses.’2 The abundance of 
fetal images and their photographic renderings in 
advertising, health campaign literature and so on, 
in all media forms, can blind us to the fact that the 
ultrasound fetal image is a very specific form of 
image produced under particular institutional circum-
stances by highly sophisticated technology. In what, 
then, does the specificity of this image consist, and 
what are the specific technological and institutional 
processes through which it is produced? What are its 
political and ethical implications? In this article, our 
perspective on the ethics and politics of ultrasound 
imaging is inspired by two major theoretical sources. 
Employing Michel Foucault’s concept of the medical 
gaze, we approach obstetrics as a biopolitical regime 
or discipline of the visible and the articulable, which 
depends on certain institutional and technological pro-
cesses and which produces and distributes individual 
and social bodies. A speculative reconstruction of an 
alternative obstetrical regime is informed by Luce 
Irigaray’s understanding of sexual difference. 
the medical gaze 
The ultrasound is a relatively recent innovation in 
the medical field structured by what Foucault called 
the ‘medical gaze’.3 This is not a merely neutral and 
scientific gaze, but a complex perceptual–linguistic 
formation that makes the invisible pathological body 
visible and readable through the employment of a 
plurality of senses. The medical gaze required a new 
concept of pathology as well as a shift in the place of 
death in the medical field. Following a series of trans-
formations, there emerged in Europe a new concept of 
disease conceived in terms of the complicated idea of 
pathological life (rather than disease as an attack on 
life from the outside), and a new kind of sign – the 
anatomo-clinical sign, which is not just a symptom but 
a marginal, restricted, imperceptible sign, diagonally 
traversing the visible body of the disease.
The concomitant new methods of seeing, hearing 
and touching attempted to read the lesional signs 
of disease projectively, to locate disease within the 
body of the patient. Signs projected an anatomico-
pathological series upon the living body; the medical 
task was now to analyse the series and map the volume 
of the body. The invention of the stethoscope was stra-
tegic in this process. The concept of the ‘gaze’ began 
to refer to a multiple and complex sensorial field, which 
Foucault describes as a new perceptual configuration 
defined by the trinity sight/touch/hearing. This new 
complex organization made it possible to locate the 
invisible spatially. Consequently, the medical gaze is 
now endowed with a plurisensorial structure; a gaze 
that touches, hears and, moreover, not by essence or 
necessity, sees.4
Since what is involved is below the threshold of 
visibility, the gaze has to touch and to listen to the 
body – to become a virtual gaze. The two-step opera-
tion of the purification of the gaze from theory and 
its becoming projective is supported by a singular, 
hidden process in which the gaze homogenizes the 
sensorial complexity. The gaze is hegemonic to the 
extent that it provides the principle of the production 
of the visibility and intelligibility of new objects such 
as tissual lesions. Once the hegemony of the gaze over 
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the other senses is established, medical discourse can 
produce its statements. 
In his interpretation of Foucault’s work, Gilles 
Deleuze argues that although the visible and the discur-
sive might overlap at particular points and form strata, 
they belong to different orders.5 If a stratum formed 
by the intersection of the visible and the statement is 
‘crossed and constituted by a central archeological 
fissure’,6 this is because the field of the ‘sensible’ 
is already irreducibly multiple and complex. There 
is a becoming-articulable and becoming-intelligible 
of what Foucault called ‘the sensible immediate’ as 
the visible. It is in this sense that Foucault under-
lines how the multisensorial perception is a way of 
anticipating the triumph of the gaze. Hearing and 
touch are regarded as merely supplementary. It is 
only in death that the triumph of the sovereign gaze 
is realized, by ‘bring[ing] to truth the luminous pres-
ence of the visible’ in autopsy.7 The scene of life is 
thus indistinguishable from death: Foucault calls this 
‘invisible visibility’. It is ‘the structure … that com-
mands clinical anatomy and all medicine that derives 
from it’.8 The ‘structure’ governs its own plurisensorial 
and heterogeneous forces by which what is invisible 
is made visible, intelligible and accessible. It is this 
structure that both governs and is reproduced by the 
technology of ultrasound imaging. 
the obstetrical regime
The first real breakthrough in fetal imaging arrived 
with the use of ultrasound in obstetrics in the 1960s.9 
The long history of ultrasound technology goes back 
to the discovery of the singular force of sound waves, 
especially high-frequency inaudible sounds and their 
echoes, in physics in the nineteenth century. The 
consequent elaboration of mathematical and physical 
theories of sound led to a number of developments 
in the use of soundwaves, for example in maritime 
navigation, radar systems and metal flaw detectors. 
It was the Scottish scientist Ian Donald who realized 
the potential of sonar to visualize a fetus and who first 
applied it to the field of obstetrics.
The ultrasound or ‘echographic’ fetal image can 
simply be described as ‘an echo outline of an inaudible 
“sound”’.10 A transducer encased in the probe of the 
ultrasound machine produces an inaudible sound wave 
which is sent into the womb through the abdominal 
surface. The body returns the sound as echo. The 
sound wave penetrating into the body is reflected in 
different intensities with respect to the density of the 
tissues of the womb and of the fetus. These echoes 
vibrate the transducer’s elements in the probe and 
are converted into electrical pulses. The electrical 
pulses are sent to the ultrasound machine, processed 
and transformed into an image on the monitor. More 
specifically, the data produced by the body’s echo are 
processed to locate and determine the level of illumi-
nation or brightness of each pixel on the screen. The 
image appears on the screen as a cumulative surface 
effect of illuminating pixels.11 
Often characterized as a ‘non-invasive’ technology, 
ultrasound imaging is an advanced instance of the 
‘instrumental mediation’ that provides the required 
‘moral distance’ while ‘fixing the virtual image of 
what is occurring well below the visible area’, to cite 
Foucault’s well-known description of its predecessor, 
the stethoscope.12 As a recent instance of the structure 
of medical knowledge, ultrasound imaging provides us 
with a live, moving screen image of what Cathryn Vas-
seleu, in her essay on endoscopy, called ‘life itself’.13 
It enlarges the obstetrical corpus of knowledge by 
extending the possibility of observation, measurement 
and calculation. This expansion of data has led to 
the formation of the new discipline of ‘fetology’. 
Fetology is based on the possibility of being able to 
identify pathologies and abnormalities on the basis 
of information supplied by ultrasound imaging of the 
fetus. The fetus is treated as a small human, a baby 
that is not yet born. In search of the anatomico-clinical 
sign, the medical practitioner traverses the body of 
the fetus, or the visual text it provides, and records its 
age, weight, the size of its ‘head’ (cephalometry), or 
of its ‘nasal structure’, as well as the expected date of 
delivery. Various other measurements take an extensive 
record of the body in search of possible pathology, 
for example abnormalities in the heart or kidneys. As 
Lisa Mitchell’s comprehensive study demonstrates, 
‘claims about what can be seen through this window 
are numerous: the state of fetal anatomy, fetal growth 
and development, hundreds of fetal pathologies, fetal 
sex as early as eleven weeks, and fetal sleep, rest and 
activity patterns’; even ‘witnessing fetal masturbation’ 
and observing ‘enough fetal behaviour’ to begin the 
practice of ‘fetal psychoanalysis’.14 For some con-
ditions, intra-uterine fetal surgery is now possible. 
Recent reports tells of vivid 3D images that show the 
fetus ‘walking’.15 The diagnosis of fetal flatfoot cannot 
be far behind. Given that walking requires a minimum 
level of motor coordination, which can in fact only be 
achieved several months after birth, we can see how 
3D ultrasound imaging facilitates the multiplication of 
such claims in a new discursive space in which it is 
increasingly difficult to distinguish between the scien-
tific and the fantasmatic. Thus, also, fetology extends 
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the medical fantasy of controlling the deviations and 
singularities of body to its very process of emergence 
and formation.
It is clear that this is not a question of ideology in 
any simple and straightforward sense. For once the 
visual text and data are available, the image is already 
individualized: a case and a file are made before the 
baby is born. The fetus is thus an unborn patient/
individual, or is treated as one, with its singularities 
and deviations. If Foucault showed that the modern 
individual is produced by disciplinary technologies 
as almost by definition pathological or abnormal, this 
disciplinary production now reaches into the prenatal 
period, before the biological birth of the individual.16 
The visual text and data furnished by the fetal 
image provide a visible form. But what is the ‘image’ 
here? When do we begin to see ‘it’? And what do we 
see, exactly? An embryo? A fetus? A baby? A small 
human? There is now a growing literature on the 
problematic nature of the border that distinguishes the 
human from the non-human, life from non-life (the 
medical literature frequently speaks of ‘the beginning 
of life’); the issue is at once biological, medical, legal 
and political. The practice of abortion is clearly one 
of the things at stake, as fetological arguments are 
routinely used and abused by the so-called pro-life 
movement. In this social-political context the desire to 
see the fetus is a singular desire to capture the very 
moment of the birth of the human, or, better, the event 
of birth as the genesis or formation of the human form 
understood in both its visual and morphological senses. 
This is part of a procedure of narrativization in which 
a number of discourses (medical, biological, familial, 
and so on) are involved. Importantly, the reading of 
this visual text begins with the moment of recognition 
of the form on the monitor. This identification is con-
ditioned by a separation: the fetus is isolated from the 
woman’s womb, regarded as mere frame or surround-
ing, and simply left ‘outside’. The separateness and 
autonomy of what we shall call the ‘originary human 
form’ is achieved by giving it a shape or Gestalt.17 
A few specific features of the scene of recognition 
need to be outlined. First, in contrast with ordi-
nary gynaecological examinations, others may also 
be present.18 The presence of others facilitates the 
perception of the fetus as a new member of the family. 
Second, the scene is governed by the medical practi-
tioner’s discourse, whose task consists of identifying 
the image, explaining its specific details to the preg-
nant woman and those who accompany her, and giving 
a medical account of the development of the fetus. The 
whole process might be described as pedagogical for 
those who are supposed to be medically and techno-
logically illiterate and therefore have to learn to see the 
image, to have the embryo or fetus identified for them. 
It is also pedagogical in the sense that it is a process 
of rationalization: clinical information is supposed to 
facilitate their rational decision-making process in an 
otherwise emotionally charged scene. With successive 
scans the medical practitioner identifies for the lay 
audience and measures various different parts and 
organs (fingers, nose, femur, genitalia) as they develop 
from one stage to the next. Throughout the lay person’s 
look is one of fascination, singularly focused on the 
virtual image, as the gradual emergence of the human 
form builds up their expectation of it.
In the context of another medical imaging tech-
nology, endoscopy, Cathryn Vassaleu argues that this 
fascinated look is better explained by an aesthetic of 
astonishment than realism or voyeurism, as the unfold-
ing of the image is subjected to innovative display and 
revelation.19 She further argues that the experience of 
seeing our dark inside displayed before us produces 
a moment of vertigo, and that the image is a ‘simu-
lacrum’ in Deleuze’s sense, an image which ‘includes 
within the lure of its implied depth a differential point 
of view – an angle which incorporates the spectator 
as part of its dissimulation’.20 The medical gaze func-
tions, in part, to keep this incorporation under control; 
that is the meaning of rationalization. The medical 
practitioner is the exemplary figure of this control, and 
a moral leader as well as a medical expert. 
Fascination is an essential aspect of the ultrasound 
fetal image as well. In fact, it takes a different and even 
greater role as the fetal image is not the image of an 
organ, a given part, but the image of a growing organic 
whole whose viewing also involves time; its Gestalt is 
emphasized as an anticipated and projected full form. 
The teleological unfolding of the totality of the origi-
nary human form implies the presupposition of an ideal 
or norm – the healthy, normal baby. Ideality and vis-
ibility are here indistinguishable from each other. The 
isolation of the fetus from the female body in which it 
is located and its identification through visualization 
or visual framing as a separate unit are guided by the 
medical practitioner’s discourse directing the parents’ 
gaze along the contours of the form. Because of this, 
the overall organization of the discursive field plays an 
important role. During the examination of the fetus, 
there is almost no reference to the woman’s body. In 
a separate procedure, the attention is turned to the 
woman’s physical condition and she may be given 
specific dietary and other instructions by the medic in 
his or her traditionally disciplinary function. 
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There are thus two aspects of obstetric examination 
today: the examination of the fetus and the discipli-
nary governance of the pregnant woman. An obvious 
consequence of the so-called ‘ultrasound revolution’ 
is the weakening of the pregnant woman’s position, 
as her verbal report has become much less significant. 
As Ann Oakley observes, the development of obstetric 
imaging 
enable[s] obstetricians to dispense with mothers as 
intermediaries, as necessary informants on fetal 
status and lifestyle. It is now possible to make 
direct contact with the fetus, and to acquire a quite 
detailed knowledge of her or his physiology and 
personality before the moment of the official transi-
tion to personhood – the time of birth.21 
While the value of the pregnant woman’s verbal report 
is of political significance in terms of the social 
structuration of sexual difference rather than merely 
as an articulation of experience, the ‘direct contact 
with the fetus’ should not be taken at face value since 
what is at stake is always a certain ordering of the 
visible and the articulable. It is worth underlining these 
nuances to forestall any easy argument that would 
simply oppose ‘women’s experience’ to an alienating 
institutional and technological power. No doubt the 
female body and women’s discourse are subject to 
control by the medical establishment, but any reference 
to ‘experience’ must take into account its historical and 
cultural variability, rather than merely opposing it to 
the abstractions of medical knowledge. The pregnant 
woman’s looking at the fetus on the monitor is in itself 
a particular form of experience that is worth consider-
ing and taking into account. 
the fetus as ethico-political figure
The production of the fetus as the ‘originary human 
form’ is the strategic element of the obstetrical regime 
as a scientific, aesthetic and ethico-political formation. 
The figuring of the fetus as originary human form has 
a long history, well documented in Karen Newman’s 
Fetal Positions. But with the development of modern 
technology it takes on significantly new dimensions. 
Ultrasound imaging is not merely a continuation of 
the tradition which begins with drawings of a little 
man placed inside the womb. The ultrasound image is 
a different figure in terms of its inscription, as well as 
its singular force. Especially with the development of 
the fibre-optic camera, the fetus is now a photographic 
referent, ‘not the optionally real thing to which an 
image or a sign refers but the necessarily real thing 
which has been placed before the lens’.22 When this 
referent is live, as it is in the ultrasound imaging, this 
rule does not change, but only gains further consist-
ency as the virtuality or spectrality of life itself.23
Before the development of fibre-optics, the fetus as 
originary human form first appeared in the pioneering 
work of the photographer Lennart Nilsson. As if to 
confirm that it is death that governs the medical scene 
of the body, Nilsson began by using dead fetuses. 
Nilsson’s famous first photograph appeared on the 
cover of Life magazine in 1965. Its title was the ‘Drama 
of Life before Birth’. This picture of a dead fetus placed 
in a photographic setting, in the idealized conditions of 
the studio, gives us the first visual framing of the origi-
nary human form in modern photography. The small 
human appears to be alive, in a standing, upright posi-
tion inside the amniotic sac, which is surrounded by a 
dark background. The contrast between the space-like 
dark background and the transparent amniotic sac, as 
well as between the latter and the standing fetus, help 
to produce the image of the small human as a distinct 
and viable life form. Its head is turned left; its feet and 
hands are crossed. The umbilical cord stretches out the 
amniotic sac. This kind of figure would later be called, 
quite appropriately, a ‘small astronaut’. Paradoxically, 
this photograph is also the first visible evidence of the 
isolation of the fetus from its living environment, the 
pregnant woman’s body. 
With the aid of fibre-optics, Nilsson has devel-
oped his technique and has reached a wide audience. 
His famous collection A Child is Born is subtitled: 
‘Dramatic and unique new photographs of life before 
birth’. Of course the photographs taken by a fibre-optic 
camera are not the same as the images produced by 
ultrasound imaging. But these images interact in the 
culture at large and constitute what we might call a 
fetal intertextuality. As Rayna Rapp has put it, ‘fetal 
images … cast an aura well beyond the obstetrical 
suite.’24 There has been, indeed, a ‘spectacularization’ 
of the fetus.25 The spectacle of the fetus reinforces the 
perception of it as a small human, a living individual 
and a viable organic form. The titles of Nilsson’s 
first picture and the later book dramatize the theatre 
or scene of the formation of the human form as 
an individual ordeal, a drama. The enigmatic and 
powerful metaphor of ‘life before birth’ signals this 
medico-political fantasy, in which what is at stake 
is not simply the individual, but also the institution 
and concept of the human subject qua individual. 
The medico-political fantasy is one of access to the 
‘before’ of the human subject – an expression of the 
desire to see the event of birth. That which is before 
the human subject must, by definition, be non-human 
and non-subject. Its discontinuity or alterity can only 
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be thought as a radical past that is nevertheless part 
of the subject, though not identical to it considered 
as consciousness. By rendering this ‘before’ visible 
and sensible in human form, fetal culture erases its 
otherness, making it continuous with the (narrative 
of the) human subject: the originary form is already 
the human subject, a separate and autonomous being. 
This is clear in interviews with Nilsson, in which he 
emphasizes the immense time and effort he spent to get 
the face of the fetus inside the womb, and talks about 
‘the portrait’, ‘the facial expressions of fetuses’, and 
so on.26 This desire to capture the face or expression 
of the fetus is surely not identical with the desire to 
capture the event of birth, but they appear together in 
fetal culture.27 
Ultrasound imaging participates in the production 
of this medico-political fantasy, either in extremis 
(when enough fetal behaviour is observed to practise 
fetal psychoanalysis), or at the mundane level of the 
family photo album. There is a notable change in 
the system of medical classification, as well as an 
increasing blurring of categories and borders: the 
strange new category of the ‘fetus-infant’ is now part 
of both obstetric and other cultural discourses.28 What 
is decisive in this fantasy is the production of the fetus 
as Gestalt, the production of an originary human form 
as visible and accessible. Of course it is also this form 
that enables the detection of possible pathologies. As 
is well known, fetal nasal formation gives informa-
tion about the possibility of Down’s syndrome, the 
length of the femur predict the potential height of the 
future child, and so on. It is thus increasingly difficult 
to maintain a foundational difference between the 
fantasmatic and the scientific. 
However, this is no reason to ignore the enormous 
and extremely problematic political implications of this 
form of visual production. Most of the measurement 
and diagnosis in ultrasound imaging can only be done 
after the legal time limit for abortion (twenty-four 
weeks in most countries). But this has not been an 
obstacle to the appropriation of the originary human 
form from the medical to the social and political 
context in anti-abortionist campaigns.29 In the famous 
anti-abortionist film Silent Scream the presenter, physi-
cian Bernard B. Nathanson, begins his narrative with 
a significant reference to fetology. As the originary 
human form is already an ethico-political figure, a 
practice of production of the human subject,30 there 
is nothing surprising in this. The originary human 
form, the medical evidence of the humanity and/or 
individuality of the fetus, is already a product of the 
obstetrical regime and medical culture. As feminists 
have long argued, the anti-abortionist metaphor of ‘life’ 
is pitted against the life of the pregnant woman. And, 
of course, what the anti-abortionist movement calls 
‘life’ is a form, a figure, in fact an installation con-
ceived in terms of the development and ultimate fixing 
of a visible form, a Gestalt. This figuring and framing 
of life, already an aesthetics, a certain organization of 
the senses and the sensible, is a founding gesture of 
the political, social, cultural and scientific imaginary. 
We should begin to think the ultrasound itself as one 
of its manifestations, motivated by the desire to see the 
event of birth, the origination of the human form. The 
citizen of our spectacular-democratic society is already 
produced in terms of a visible form, a Gestalt. What 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe called onto-typology, the 
installation of a type, is certainly not limited to fascism 
or nationalism, but is already a constitutive part of the 
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apparently more flexible consumerist culture.31 In the 
anti-abortionist argument, the fetus thus becomes a 
political figure, a human subject with rights, a small 
citizen who has a right to life, because it is already 
given a visible form by the medical gaze as well as the 
spectacular practices of given culture in the cultural 
fetal text. In this, the woman’s body is produced as 
margin or frame: it is both outside what it frames 
and yet absolutely necessary to its very visibility as 
image.32 What might be some of the possible forms 
of engaging this hegemonic figuration of life to undo 
its separationist gesture and its Gestalt? 
the fetal text 
Focusing solely on the production of the visibility of 
the fetus, the ultrasound produces an isolated form. But 
is this all there is to it? A closer look suggests not.33 
First, the ultrasound fetal image is not always upright 
though it is often made so by photographic manipula-
tion, the uprightness and the erection of a (phallic) 
figure connoting invisibility in general. Moreover, the 
ultrasound fetal image does not offer an absolutely 
clear and transparent sight either; it is a blurred image 
which one must learn to see even at the most advanced 
and visible stages of fetal development. We are thus 
witness to an unfolding that is never absolutely clear, 
though increasingly perceptible, essentially tied to the 
medic’s guiding discourse and the power of projection 
of the medical gaze. 
However, the alterity of the fetus is irreducible, 
and something of this alterity is inevitably inscribed 
on the monitor. Its ghostly apparition is only a trace, 
never satisfying our expectation of a full appearance, 
though we continue to be fascinated by the signs of life 
that it keeps sending. Can the binarisms that organize 
the cultural context of this fascinating production 
(mind/body, sign/referent, idea/matter, man/woman) 
really account for what is at stake in this uncanny 
appearance? If the fascination and astonishment iden-
tified by Vasselu in the context of endoscopy is that 
much more strongly felt in the face of the ultrasound 
fetal image, it is because in it we seem to witness 
the amazing genesis or formation of the human form. 
Perhaps the ‘figuring’ of the body’s Gestalt as the 
originary human form in which the narrative of the 
human subject is reinforced and re-inscribed should 
also be considered in its other senses, such as meta-
phorizing or allegorizing. 
But if the alterity of the fetus and/or body remains 
irreducible, can it be considered merely as ‘object’ or 
‘referent’ simply represented or imaged by medical 
technology? Jose van Dijck has observed one strange 
consequence of the use of medical imaging tech-
nologies: the more transparent the body is made by 
medical imaging, the more complex it turns out to 
be. Hence ‘the mediated body is everything but trans-
parent; it is precisely this complexity and stratification 
that makes it a contested cultural object.’34 This com-
plexity needs to be borne well in mind, for in noting 
the discursive–institutional–technological arrangement 
that governs the whole process by visually isolating the 
fetus from the woman’s body and by producing it as 
an originary human form, we should also be careful to 
avoid reducing the whole process to an ideological or 
technological manipulation that simply and exclusively 
serves to maintain the system. 
If ultrasound imaging is a product of our will to 
know the ‘sensible immediate’, as Foucault called 
it, the medical gaze which this technology takes to 
a new phase already depends on a ‘plurisensorial 
structure’, as he underlined. Is this not the complexity 
of the body itself, as observed by Jose van Dijck? The 
prime instrumental mediator in Foucault’s narrative, 
the stethoscope, made the invisible visible by touching 
and listening. Ultrasound imaging makes it visible by 
sending inaudible sound waves into the body. What 
is inaudible to the human ear is registered or ‘heard’ 
by the tissural substance of the body, which responds 
to the source by echoing the sounds it receives. The 
body – matter – is itself a differential force field. As 
the tissues of the womb and of the fetus have different 
densities, they reflect the high-frequency sounds in 
different intensities. These echoes are then converted 
into electrical pulses, which are processed and trans-
formed into an image by the ultrasound machine. In 
the conventional account of this process, the machine 
uses a part of the body as its object, thus embodying 
the power of the medical institution over the body 
of the pregnant woman. However, as the body’s tis-
sular morphology participates in the in-formation and 
in-scription of its image, it is not just passive, inert 
matter in this process. If the obstetrical regime and 
its ultrasound machine are a power–knowledge tech-
nology in familiar Foucauldian terms, then this power’s 
‘condition of possibility … must not be sought in the 
primary existence of a central point … it is the moving 
substrate of force relations’ (our emphasis).35 The 
body’s tissular structure is this ‘moving substrate of 
force relations’, and this resonating differentiality has 
a force of (mathematical) inscription. This is in fact 
what Jacques Derrida means when he defines writing 
as a differential force field: 
Force itself is never present; it is only a play of 
differences and quantities. There would be no force 
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in general without the differences between forces; 
and here the difference in quantity counts more than 
the content of quantity, more than the absolute size 
itself.36 
When Jose van Dijck describes ultrasound imaging 
as an ‘inscription technology … which seek(s) to 
dispose of mediation (such as an artist’s drawing) 
and instead record the interior body directly onto the 
machine’,37 she returns to a conventional description 
of the process of production of fetal imaging and 
overlooks her own observation on the increasing com-
plexity of the body. Van Dijck’s description presumes 
and reiterates conventional metaphysical distinctions 
between subject and object, mind and body, active 
and passive, and science/knowledge and real. This 
conventional approach forecloses the question of the 
relation of these terms by taking them as simply 
separate. What is at stake is of course an inscription, 
but the relationship between the body (matter, refer-
ent, object) and ultrasound machine (mind, science, 
subject) is not merely external. The body’s increasing 
complexity means that, rather than simply being the 
immediate, transparent datum waiting to be recorded 
and imaged by scientific/technological apparatus, its 
power of inscription already implicates and involves 
science/technology. The body on which culture or mind 
works is not non-textual, inert matter. It would be more 
appropriate to consider it as the scene of inscription. 
As Vicki Kirby says, the body is ‘unstable – a shifting 
scene of inscription that both writes and is written’.38 
In this sense, the body is a text without limits.39 We 
should perhaps consider the counter-intuitive thought 
that, even though babies are born and become human 
subjects, the body’s work of giving birth to itself, 
forming and figuring itself, is never done, for it is 
never itself, but also always already its other. Reading 
technology as simply a site of domination or aliena-
tion is to misread seriously Foucault’s concept of 
power–knowledge, reducing body to a merely passive 
receiver submitted to the alienating power of the 
machine. 
This takes us back to the political problem 
identified above: the contribution of the ultrasound 
image of the fetus as Gestalt or ‘the originary 
human form’ to the fetal text of culture at large, 
by its visual appropriation and manipulation by the 
anti-abortion movement and the articulation of the 
highly problematic yet powerful concept of the right 
to life. In thinking the productive undecidability of 
the body (both written and writing), politics is no 
longer limited to representationalism. For, if the body 
is made up of differential forces, rather than a merely 
functional whole, its so-called Gestalt or originary 
form is already textual or virtual. That is to say, as 
a differential force writing, figuring and complexify-
ing itself, the body is always in excess of itself and 
cannot simply be contained in a single privileged 
representation, taken as a model or Gestalt. (Perhaps 
difference is becoming-body.) Accordingly, the only 
possible politics will not be a representational politics 
of rights. The experience of the ultrasound poses a 
number of interesting and challenging consequences 
for researchers, scientists, artists and political organ-
izers. How can we re-figure or re-mark the relational-
ity of the fetus, and of life? How can the relationship 
between the visible and the articulable be organized 
in new ways so that new perceptions are opened up, 
new words are in order? How can we dis-organize 
or de-compose what seems to be so well composed 
in medical discourse and imaging? The questions 
multiply when we take our topic beyond its restricted 
medical field. Do we have any idea what happens 
when an inaudible sound wave touches our bodies? 
What is it that we call hearing? How can we begin 
to think the universe as ultrasonar, or ‘echographic’ 
(resonance writing), as the French term for the ultra-
sound so aptly puts it? If the body’s manifold surface 
has a power of hearing beyond its organic functional-
ity, what music or silence, what rhythms comprise 
our bodies? What other figures and forms are they 
capable of producing?40 When Foucault described the 
medical gaze as a plurisensorial structure, he already 
touched something of the complexity of the body 
and its heterogeneous powers, through the fascinating 
textuality of medicine. 
Placenta: difference and mediation
Thus far we have spoken of the body as if it is one. 
This is because, first, in ultrasound imaging both 
bodies, the pregnant body and the fetus’s body, respond 
to the high-frequency sounds emitted by the ultrasound 
machine to produce one image; and, second, because 
our purpose was to question the opposition between 
active technology/mind and passive matter/body, in 
order to be able to think the body differently. Even 
though we have to talk about two bodies (the woman 
and the fetus), these ‘two’ are not the opposite of or 
outside the ‘one’, and vice versa. It would be rather 
easy to reverse the opposition between opposition and 
non-opposition, to celebrate the limitless body against 
the oppositional logic of a given culture/medicine. But 
this is not our aim here. Binary logic can never simply 
be left behind. As the production of woman involves 
the hegemonic oppositions of mind and body, sign 
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and referent, and so on, the body must be re-marked 
in order to destabilize her place in the economy of 
sexual difference. 
Paul Virilio once wrote: ‘man is woman’s passenger, 
not only at birth but also during sexual relations … 
you might say that the female is the means man has 
chosen to reproduce himself, that is to say, to come to 
the world.’41 As the passenger ‘man’ is also considered 
to be the subject of humanness, Virilio’s metaphor 
rewrites and erases sexual difference in the same 
movement. But this inscription of woman’s body as 
medium or vehicle remains ambiguous. On the one 
hand, it seems to conform to the way in which the 
obstetrical regime produces her as necessary yet non-
existing frame, ground or surrounding in which the 
human body comes to form itself, allegedly autono-
mously. On the other hand, the same metaphor of 
medium or vehicle also admits that the woman’s body 
can actually tolerate the other’s presence within itself 
without incurring illness or death for itself or for the 
guest/passenger it carries. 
In fact, the separation or isolation that is so easily 
assumed is impossible if we actually attend to the 
medical and biological evidence. Luce Irigaray refuses 
to consider sexual difference in terms of a simple 
distinction between sex (natural given) and gender 
(social and cultural construction), inviting us to take 
nature, biology or anatomy seriously.42 Her argument 
insists that the nature/culture distinction has significant 
implications for feminism: woman is conventionally 
associated with nature and the body, taken to be the 
mute and passive matter interpreted and constructed 
by culture/mind/man. In the name of criticizing this 
biological reductionism, a conventional sex/gender dis-
tinction risks leaving nature intact. Accordingly, the 
biological text cannot emerge as a field of interpreta-
tion and intervention, and scientific discourse is also 
left unquestioned. In this, body or matter is taken as 
immutable substance. But emphasizing the plasticity 
of the body and matter, its power of transforming 
itself, its productivity and mutability, the biological, 
anatomical or natural betrays a dazzling complexity 
that does not readily fit into our received notions of 
science or scientific causality. 
In this context Irigaray’s short interview with the 
feminist biologist Helene Rouch is relevant.43 Rouch’s 
work focuses on the intriguing role of the placenta. 
This vascular appendage, attached to the wall of 
uterus, does not merely connect the fetus with the 
womb; as an arrangement of vessels the placenta actu-
ally mediates between the ‘self’ (the mother’s body) 
and ‘other’ (embryo/fetus) – even though it is produced 
by the embryo. It regulates blood circulation and 
exchanges between the two organisms by reallocating 
maternal substances for the benefit of both. The cultur-
ally widespread interpretation of the fetus as a sort 
of vampire in the mother’s womb is not substantiated 
by the evidence concerning the role of the placenta, 
which rather suggests a peaceful, economic habitation 
of one with(in) the other. The mother’s body recog-
nizes the fetus as an ‘other’, a different organism that 
grows within itself, and redistributes its own forces 
accordingly, while the fetus recognizes similarly this 
surrounding as a habitat from which it feeds itself 
through the placental fold. Hence the maternal order 
of the female body organizes a kind of relationship 
that is ‘respectful of the life of both’.44 The placenta 
signifies a form of mediation in which difference 
is not merely sublated (as it is supposed to be in a 
conventional Hegelian reading), but maintained. We 
might also add that the placenta can be seen on the 
monitor and is examined by the doctor, but there is 
no special focus on it unless there is a pathological 
condition such as bleeding or thickening. In appear-
ance, it is a shapeless, bloody lump. 
Rouch’s emphasis on the role of placenta expresses 
a different problematic of life than that of the hege-
monic fetal culture and obstetrical regime. Hegemonic 
culture/medicine conceives life in terms of a visible 
form or Gestalt, which introduces a hierarchical oppo-
sition of figure and ground, but in the placental model 
the woman’s body is no longer merely the frame or 
ground of a visible form. Nor is it a merely revalued 
habitat (or vehicle). The woman’s body is now regarded 
as a singular organism that enables another to live on 
equal terms with(in) itself. It is important to underline 
the radicality of this approach: the female body/woman 
is an active organism or life form with its own singular 
order. Further, in this figuring of the female body, life 
itself is figured as relationality rather than in terms of 
an isolated, autonomous form, standing on its own. If 
life has to do with the form or ‘morphe’ and morph-
ology, then the very formation of the form is relational 
through and through. 
Rouch speaks further about the nature of this 
amazing fold of tissue, particularly with regard to 
its strength and the several uses to which it is put 
in contemporary capitalist economies, especially in 
the cosmetics industry. She argues powerfully for the 
pregnant woman’s right to have the placenta treated 
as part of her organism. Categorized as a useless 
excess whose function is complete after the birth, the 
placenta is usually appropriated by hospitals and sold 
to cosmetic firms. But there is reason to reconsider the 
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nature of its use value. The placenta is an organ of a 
woman’s body, which serves a particular function in 
producing value (children). The fact that it is reused 
economically hides the fact that this shapeless, bloody 
lump is the excess of the reference we call body, the 
very support or medium of its figuring and forming 
of itself. 
In her early work, Irigaray interpreted Plato’s cave 
as the womb, the original matrix, and the philosopher 
himself as obstetrician.45 In the allegory of the cave in 
the Republic Plato adds voice and speech to complete 
the illusion of reality from which ordinary men suffer, 
associating the echoes with the shadows on the wall.46 
From Plato’s text to the ultrasound, there is also a 
reversal: while Plato makes the voice (resonance or 
echo) follow and supplement the image (shadows or 
copies) in the textual articulation of his allegory, the 
ultrasound image is produced by echo. Plato’s allegory 
is consistent with the myth of Narcissus, in which Echo 
(the water nymph) repeats his lover Narcissus’s words. 
But if we follow Gayatri Spivak, attending to the origi-
nal Latin text, Echo’s repetition is with a difference: 
to Narcissus’s question ‘why do you fly from me?’ 
she echoes with the phrase ‘fly from me’.47 Spivak’s 
underlining of this difference also implies that there is 
always a gap in nature. Its resonance is never without 
difference – the one is always already two. If the cave/
womb is an ‘invisible space’ in the conventional patri-
archal paradigm, it is also an echo chamber. Woman’s 
association with the body/matter/nature is not simply 
an ideological evil, which must be eliminated, but also 
an opportunity to intervene into the presumption of the 
unity of this series. Without such an intervention, it is 
difficult to maintain a viable feminist position against 
the spectacularizations of capitalist and patriarchal 
techno-scientific culture. Science and technology, 
including the medical gaze and the ultrasound, are a 
major site for this intervention, for it is their unfolding 
concepts and fields which enable us to approach the 
multisensorial, complex and ever-changing language 
of the body. 
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